Expert Comment: Can Europe hold the line of liberal democracies?

In recent weeks, looking at the European Union (EU), and Europe at large, one is reminded of a pair of wire-stripping pliers.

Forgive the lack of grandeur in the metaphor. These pliers have blades that grip and cut into a wire’s insulation before pulling it away, leaving the core exposed. Likewise, with Putin pressing from one side and Trump retreating on the other, Europe finds itself stripped of its protective layer and left vulnerable.

Part of the push for digital autonomy includes reducing bureaucracy to make it easier for companies to innovate and create a more agile market... The danger lies in confusing bureaucracy with regulations, and in concluding that European defence and its digitalisation could benefit from deregulation. To assume this would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater. 

Professor Mariarosaria Taddeo, Oxford Internet Institute

Two areas where this vice-like grip is felt most acutely are European defence and digital technology. The former has become pressing in recent days; yet only months ago, it was almost taboo. To propose, as a philosopher, a common European defence was to risk being branded as a warmonger, an idealist, even naïve, oblivious to the deep-seated defence differences among member states.

Philosophy, when applied to the times we live in, often has a Cassandra effect; it offers warnings and insights that prove accurate, yet are dismissed until it is too late. It’s both a blessing and a curse of this kind of work. The latter has seen a sharp acceleration since Trump's victory.

With the newly appointed European Commission, the EU has, for the first time, appointed a Commissioner for Defence and Space, Kubilius, who has produced a White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030. Its aim is to bolster the defences of Member States and establish a credible deterrent against Russia by 2030. This strikes me as an optimistic ambition. Though, like all ambitions, its true purpose lies in generating momentum, both for Member States and for Europe's defence industry.

Kubilius must also secure support for the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), proposed by the Commission with a €1.5 billion budget. At the same time, the EU has underscored its intention to develop European digital technologies, strengthening local businesses in an effort to cultivate strategic autonomy from American firms, which have been all too eager to align with the neoliberal instincts of the Trump administration.

But it is not merely the timing that binds European defence and digital policy. Defence itself is becoming digital. This transformation began with the first Gulf War and reached a point of no return with the war in Ukraine.

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that the vast quantities of data we produce daily, combined with artificial intelligence (AI), are crucial for modern defence operations, from intelligence gathering to kinetic warfare. And it’s not just AI – satellites, blockchain, data sharing infrastructures like data lakes, data warehouses, and data fabrics – have all found applications in defence, and their role will continue to expand.

This is where European defence and strategic autonomy in the digital realm intersect: a robust European defence is dependent on the development of European digital technology. This convergence is both necessary and desirable, but it carries a risk (always the voice of Cassandra).

Part of the push for digital autonomy includes reducing bureaucracy to make it easier for companies to innovate and create a more agile market. In part this is a response to the Trump administration’s radical neoliberal approach to digital governance. The danger lies in confusing bureaucracy with regulations, and in concluding that European defence and its digitalisation could benefit from deregulation. To assume this would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater.

Defence, particularly war, is the ultimate test of liberal democratic values. The extent to which we are willing to violate those values in order to defend ourselves reveals just how deeply they are embedded.

European defence must be more than just a marketplace for defence companies; it must be built with full respect for the values underpinning liberal democratic and principles of Just War Theory from the beginning. If there is one role the EU should strive to play in the current global scenario, it is to be the champion of those values.

This role is increasingly difficult to maintain, but it must be defended, above all by refusing to emulate those who are abandoning it.